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The Greek Inception,
Phusis, and Ultimate
Temporality:
Humanity as Time Itself
Michael Poussard

W

hat is a human being? For centuries, and even today,
many have considered man to be a breathing organism
endowed with a higher intellect—a rational animal. This
classification seems to serve the twofold purpose of presenting man
as quite similar to other beings while highlighting his one key
distinction. For Aristotle (arguably the most influential of the Greek
philosophical giants), the faculty of reason suffices to distinguish
mankind from the rest of nature. Implicit in this understanding is that
the existence of a being with such a faculty is purely contingent.
Therefore, it is not at all far-fetched to imagine a world devoid of
humans. Nature would simply continue to operate and even to be
perceivable in just the same way as it is now. Since we are merely
beings that happen to be present along with the multiplicity of other
beings, all aspects of nature, even the elusive concept of time, reside
outside of ourselves; they may be perceived by us, but they do not
arise from or depend upon us.
Standing forth as one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth
century is Martin Heidegger. A prolific yet enigmatic German,
Heidegger regards the above metaphysical/Aristotelian definition of
mankind as entirely inadequate. By asserting the historicality and
ultimate temporality of Dasein (the being for whom Being is an
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issue), Heidegger seeks to return to the originary question of Being,
the Greek Inception that long ago became obscured and concealed by
metaphysics’ reduction of all entities to mere presence-at-hand,
finally establishing that humanity—Dasein—is time itself.
I. The Demise of the Inception
Throughout Heidegger’s works runs what seems to be a
continuous strain of nostalgia for the Ancient Greeks. However, his
longing for a return to the ancients is far more than mere romanticism.
Having come from a background imbibed with Christianity (spending
time himself in Jesuit formation), he reacted in an intensely negative
way towards Catholic dogma. One who adheres to a faith has already
had the question of Being answered for him; thus, he cannot approach
it authentically—he no longer lives with the question 1 Rather, the
question of philosophy, the broadest, deepest, and most originary
question—Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?—never
comports itself to its times, but imposes itself upon the times. It
“either projects far beyond its own time, or else binds its time back to
this time’s earlier and inceptive past.” 2 In response to modernity’s
“rootless organization of the average man,” 3 Martin Heidegger seeks
some sort of restoration of the Greek Inception: when untimely
philosophy first stood forth among humanity. What did this inception
consist in? Why and how did it devolve?
At the dawn of philosophy, a particular “fundamental orientation
to Being” 4 had been set forth by the thinkers and poets such that
beings were thought of as a whole as phusis—what emerges from
itself, an unfolding and persistence, the emerging-abiding sway “by
virtue of which beings first become and remain observable.” Phusis
encompasses both Being and becoming, embodying all of heaven and
earth, past and present, high and low. 5 It shaped and informed the
Greek society as a whole—its underlying relation to Being. While
effects of this great inception still reverberate today, all philosophy
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since then has been a mere devolvement of understanding of the true
nature of Being as such.
“[The philosophy of the Greeks] came to an end in greatness with
Aristotle.” 6 As is Heidegger’s custom, he reverses common
perceptions of time and relationality. The philosophy of the Greeks
came to an end with Plato and Aristotle. But, really, the philosophy of
the Greeks began to come to an end with these thinkers. Its “end” was
actually the end of its beginning, its inception. The end of the
inception was not an end of the Greek relationship to Being, but
rather the beginning of its downward trajectory away from phusis and
towards beings. The Greek relation to Being does continue
(vestigially) to remain even today, gradually concealing itself. Plato
and Aristotle lay only on the cusp of this downward trajectory. Yet
this was somehow the end, the greatest and most lamentable moment:
the reduction of Being—phusis—to “beingness”—ousia. 7
Perhaps the greatest and the closest philosopher to the rightful
conception of Being, Aristotle receives the bulk of Heidegger’s
criticism. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle almost follows the
understanding of Being as phusis, seeking the “first causes of being as
being.” 8 However, from the start, the reduction of philosophy to prose
and logic gives away the fall from the initial inception. “Only poetry
is of the same order as philosophical thinking,” both of which bring
beings out of their monotony and everydayness. 9 In contrast to
Aristotle, the pre-Socratics admired by Heidegger and most closely
associated with the Greek Inception—Parmenides and Heraclitus—
wrote in verse.
Aristotle seemed to direct his thoughts inward upon beings at the
expense of Being in his focus on ousia, the underlying substance
behind things. Thus begins the Greek “ontology of Vorhandenheit,”
or the present-at-hand. 10 In their search for the essence of Being, the
Greeks narrowed their focus upon the observable world
(Vorhandenheit), intending to then abstract the meaning of Being as
such. However, this approach has shown itself to be fruitless. This
error pervades and persists to this day: the end of the inception
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occurred when philosophy had begun to mistake nature for the
world. 11
II. Aristotle, Mankind, and Time
For the moment, let us leave Heidegger behind and explore
Aristotle on his own terms, particularly his Metaphysics. “All human
beings by nature stretch themselves out toward knowing.” 12 Knowing
comes from the senses. Therefore, we take pleasure in using the
senses. The greatest sense (and this underlies Platonism as well—
images) is sight, for it is the most comprehensive, most
discriminating, and most freeing sense. For Aristotle and Plato, to
know something is to see it as it is. From this concept comes the
Platonic term eidos, which is translated “idea,” but literally means the
“look” of a thing. To seek wisdom in philosophy is the highest form
of seeing, the fulfillment of wonder, and the highest activity in which
man can engage.
Wonder leads to both poetry and philosophy. These answer the
great questions of mankind. Ought they both to be pursued? The
poets’ assertion of divine jealousy provides the reason for Aristotle’s
assertion that poets lie and should not be followed—“many lyrics are
lies.” 13 Therefore, philosophy is the one avenue to the satisfying of
wonder. This wonder is unique to man—the animals do not wonder
because they do not have such a faculty; the gods do not wonder
because they already know all things. Philosophy is the highest
activity of man because it aims higher—and it can only do this
because man is not the highest being, but occupies a particular space
in the realm of being. 14
It would seem that man is that being who wonders, who thinks.
However, Aristotle, in defining the essence of man, decides not to do
so starting with what makes man unique, but from what makes him
the same. While the Metaphysics emphasizes mankind’s reaching
towards knowing, i.e., wonder, Aristotle elsewhere (De Anima III.11)
compiles human nature into a concoction of the essence of a plant,
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with the addition of the essence of an animal and the addition of
wonder/intellect. A substance is defined by its essence—the
combination of all these things. Therefore, Aristotle defines man’s
essence from things which are present in the world. 15
Here, we see the above-mentioned shift from phusis to ousia at
work. Man, as the being that wonders, is yet grouped with all other
objects of the senses, analyzed, and categorized in the same way that
trees, rocks, and gods are categorized. All sense of the unfolding of
Being is gathered into the small sense of discovery—the wisest
person knows all things. 16 Therefore, for the wisest person, there
would be nothing left to be disclosed. To live is merely to be
present. 17
One of the few things studied by Aristotle that absolutely resists
being placed into the world as present-at-hand is the concept of time.
In his Physics, the question of “Does time exist?” is posed before an
inquiry is made as to its nature. 18 Time is difficult to deny as part of
our existence; yet it cannot be pinpointed as existing in the way in
which other objects of study exist. Perhaps time is the chain of
“nows,” but the now ceases to be immediately as it comes into
existence. Can it, then, be said to be at all?
We can indeed say that time is by virtue of there being change.
However, our experience of time, despite the uniformity of days,
weeks, and years, is not at all consistent. Hours seem to fly by in an
instant while asleep. Time moves quickly when we are occupied and
slowly when we are bored. Yet based on the motions of the heavens,
it seems that it is our experience only of time, and not time itself, that
varies. This poses interesting new questions as to the nature of time.
It seems, prima facie, that time is identical with change or
movement; when things are changing rapidly, time seems to go
quickly; when things do not seem to be changing at a sufficient rate,
time moves slowly. When we are asleep and do not perceive change
at all until we rise, it seems that the “now” of rising happened
immediately after the “now” of falling asleep, although we know that
hours have passed. However, while change gives us some sense of
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time, it cannot be identical with time itself. Change is movement in
space, yet time has no position in space. Furthermore, our only direct
way of experiencing time is through the now. The memory tells us
that there have been other “nows” that are no longer accessible, and
we know that this now will immediately pass into oblivion and be
replaced by a new now. In its very becoming, the now is destroyed.
Therefore, it is not a unit of time, but an infinitely divisible
connection that can never be fully present as such. 19 Because of this,
time, in a sense, can be said not to be; it is never fully present. Yet,
without time, there can be no presence; all things appear in a now.
Time as it actually is, according to Aristotle—future and past
connected by the always-present now (“it is the now that measures
time”)—is not identical with change or movement. Rather, it is the
measure of change in respect to the before and after. 20 The now links
the before to the after, the past to the future. It marks the end of the
past and the beginning of the future in the same way that a circle is
both concave and convex. The essence of time is the now, which is
always the same as every other now, yet completely unique because
things in the world have changed. Although time is not present to us
in the way that things in the world are present, it is undoubtedly there
and necessary. The now cannot “stop,” for in its becoming, it
immediately gives way to another now. “Time will not fail, for it is
always at a beginning.” 21
III. Heidegger, Destruction, and Restoration
The task at hand in Being and Time—to set metaphysics free
from the accretions which have gathered since the Greek Inception—
must be accomplished through destruction of the ontology of
Vorhandenheit. 22 In section II of this essay, Aristotle’s Physics was
the primary source used. According to Heidegger, it is actually the
Physics of Aristotle which grounds his Metaphysics by establishing
the ontology of Vorhandenheit: the fall of man—Dasein—to mere
presence-at-hand. 23
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The Greek approach to beings—seeking out the look, the eidos, of
a thing—was taken for granted as the sole way to approach Being.
However, the look of things is only perceived through the interpretive
lens of the being of Dasein. Failing to acknowledge or account for
this, the post-inception Greeks turned their inquiry inwards upon
themselves, attempting to circularly arrive at the substance of
mankind through the very lens of mankind—an absurdity akin to
seeking the inner workings of a telescope by using the telescope to
search. The assumption was made that man must be merely one being
among others. This insufficient classification does not become an
ontological problem for these philosophers, as Heidegger claims it
should have.
In defining man as rational animal, something living which has
reason, man is understood as being present-at-hand: Vorhandenheit. 24
However, “over and above the attempt to determine the essence of
‘man’ as an entity, the question of his Being has remained forgotten .
. . [it] is rather conceived as something obvious or ‘self-evident’ in
the sense of the Being-present-at-hand of other created Things.” 25 It
is this conception of the being of man that Heidegger attempts to
completely subvert. This is what he intends by the destruction of
metaphysics: not to eradicate it, but to shake off all that has followed
from the reduction of man to present-at-hand and then to rebuild from
the original, foundational, inceptive Phusis.
What, then, is Heidegger’s answer for the Being of man, of
Dasein? While the scope of this essay is not to explicate exhaustively
the Being of Dasein as described in Being and Time, the following,
cursory considerations should be sufficient to adequately draw several
conclusions in comparison with Aristotle.
We know that “the person is not a Thing, not a substance, not an
object.” 26 We know that the answer cannot be derived from empirical
science or from the look of a thing, for this already presumes an
ontical understanding of Being; but the ontological foundations are
always already ‘there.’ 27 These foundations, overlooked by Aristotle
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and concealed for centuries by the very nature of Being itself, are
what Heidegger explores and seeks out in Being and Time.
What is our relationship to Vorhandenheit? For Dasein, things are
meaningful, not quantitative. “All ‘wheres’ are discovered and
circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in everyday dealings;
they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational
measurement of space.” 28 Our understanding of things in space is not
that they are plotted out in a system of coordinates; our spatiality is
entirely relational. Something is “above,” “below,” “on the floor,” or
“in the sky.” We carry with us ideas of left and right. 29 “Dasein is
‘spatial’ with regard to its Being-in-the-world.” 30
Relationality and concern in regard to the present-at-hand,
however, hardly exhaust the Being of Dasein. The most profound
expression of this Being is Dasein’s relation to itself. Everyday
Dasein, in its normal failure to take notice of Being as such, falls into
the they-self, into averageness and inauthenticity. This is so common
a state that Heidegger asserts that, proximally and for the most part,
Dasein is “they.” 31 Rather than live in the “they,” Dasein should seek
to arrive at “Authentic Being-one’s-Self.” 32
To be authentic, Dasein must understand itself as “thrown, fallen
projection.” As thrown, Dasein is placed into its world not of its own
accord. It did not decide where or when to be born, nor even to exist
in the first place. As fallen, Dasein finds itself in the midst of and
alongside other beings. As projection, Dasein futurally anticipates
itself as possibilities; this is not formulating a plan, but letting those
possibilities be as such. 33 Dasein is what it has been, what it is, and
what it becomes—allowing it to say with understanding to itself:
“Become what you are.” 34
In these ways, Dasein can be said to be in both the what has been
and the what will be. Dasein is temporal. It is not merely “in time;”
its very being is rooted in this temporality, this unity of past, present,
and future in thrown, fallen projection.
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IV. What is Time?
Reversing chronology, Heidegger intends to be the ancient of the
ancients, “to proceed up towards the hidden roots of Greek thought in
a more radical way than Aristotle himself ever did.” 35 Aristotle was
the greatest and the closest to the proper understanding of Being,
reaching a “more original ground” than even Plato.36
Let us now recall Aristotle’s Physics. It is clear that time indeed
is, but it is not in the way that other things are. His most concise
formulation of time is: “those aspects of motion which we count with
regard to before and after.”37 With all this in mind, it certainly cannot
be denied that Dasein is. Yet, we see that Dasein (like time) is not in
the same way that other things are. The mistake of ignoring the latter
statement destroyed metaphysics, ended the Greek Inception, and sent
philosophy spiraling downwards, further and further from the true
essence of Being—phusis.
We now see clearly that Aristotle’s description of time, the one
thing that he encountered as existing in an entirely different way than
all other things (present-at-hand), ought to be applied to mankind
itself. The connection of past, present, and future in Aristotle is at
stake here. To Aristotle, being means that which is in the present. The
past no longer is, and the future is not-yet. 38 These are all, however,
connected in his concept of time—no now can come into being of its
own accord, but is rather begotten by the demise of the previous now.
It takes its existence from all of the nows that preceded it, connecting
them to all of the nows yet to come. This concept is precisely the
thrown, fallen projection, the ultimate historicality, of Dasein.
Furthermore, the problem of individuation runs deeply within
Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Heidegger asserts that time itself, Dasein’s
temporality, is what individuates: it allows for Dasein’s “unique
thisness and one-time-ness of its thereness, which it alone can seize,
thus becoming entirely non-substitutable by any other being.” 39 In
Aristotle’s lowering of the essence of a being to its genus, he allows
for ultimate and unbounded substitutability that is contrary to our
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experience of the self and of others. In contrast to the modern
“rootless organization of the average man,” the platitude “you are
unique” still rings true, despite its triteness.
“To appreciate and study time, one must genuinely ask: ‘Am I
time?’” 40 The question is not formulated, “is humanity time?” Rather,
arriving at an authentic understanding of oneself is intensely personal.
While no Dasein can exist on its own (even a hermit has come from
society/historicality), to live as thrown, fallen projection towards
death, authentically embracing mortality is a feat that only the
individual him or herself, in resoluteness, can achieve. The ultimate
question of Being—of phusis—is lived with and explored,
approached and re-asked, by each generation and each individual. To
have an answer, however, is to eliminate the question. Rather, we
must seek to live with the question. Being and Time ends, quite
poignantly: “Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of
Being?” 41
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